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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSALIND JACKSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY, Case No. 17601 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
JAMES N. BARBER, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for professional negligence or legal 
malpractice. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of 
defendant-respondent Dabney and against the plaintiff, no cause 
of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Dabney seeks an affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief 12 
not complete, and in order to advise the Court fully as to the 
factual background out of which this case arises we deem it 
necessary to restate the facts. 
We recognize that on this appeal plaintiff and appellant 
is entitled to have the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom viewed in a light most favorable to her, and that if, 
in any view of the evidence, a fair-minded jury could find in her 
favor, and against the respondent, the judgment should be 
reversed. The facts set forth below are either established 
without contradiction in the record, or if there is a dispute in 
the facts, we have stated plaintiff's version of the facts for 
purposes of this appeal. 
The facts upon which the trial court based its ruling 
are contained in allegations and admissions in the pleadings, 
answers to various interrogatories propounded by one party to t~ 
other, and the testimony of the plaintiff on her deposition. The 
pages of the deposition are not separately numbered as part of 
the record. References to the record will be prefaced by the 
letter "R," and to plaintiff's deposition by the abbreviation 
"Depos." 
This action was initiated by the plaintiff as a malprac-
tice action against two separate attorneys, defendant and respo~ 
dent Dabney, and James N. Barber. (R. 2-4). Prior to trial, 
summary judgment was entered in favor of defendant Dabney and 
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against the plaintiff, no cause of action. (R. 155-156). The 
action as against defendant Barber came regularly on for trial, 
and was compromised and settled by the parties during trial for 
the amount of $4000. (R. 178, 181). Plaintiff then commenced 
this appeal as against defendant Dabney. (R. 182-183). 
Plaintiff first consulted with defendant Dabney in 
approximately 1975. (Depos. 12). At that time, she and her hus-
band were the joint owners of a residential property located at 
3201 Whitehall Drive. (Depos. 4). Plaintiff and her husband had 
acquired the property by purchasing the prior owner's equity for 
$2,100, and assuming the balance owed on the mortgage of $17,000. 
(Depos. 10). At the time plaintiff first consulted Dabney, this 
residential property was encumbered not only with the unpaid 
mortgage lien, the balance of which was then about $12,000, but 
also by numerous judgment liens and tax liens. (Depos. 10, 14 
and 15; Exhibit 1 to deposition; R. 44 to 45 and 63 to 68). 
The particular event which caused plaintiff to consult 
Dabney initially was threatened foreclosure of a judgment lien in 
favor of one Orson Gygi. Dabney made appropriate arrangements 
for settlement of that claim. (Depos. 16). 
Because many of the judgment liens were then several 
years old, Dabney recommended that nothing be done about the 
others at that time, and that they be permitted to expire by a 
lapse of time, if this was possible. However, plaintiff desired 
to have all of these liens removed, if possible, and insisted 
that Dabney write to all creditors and attempt to compromise all 
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of the judgment debts for about 20 percent. Dabney, in accor-
dance with her desires, undertook to do this, but only one credi-
tor responded. (Depos. 19 to 28; R. 70 to 80). 
Dabney faithfully reported to plaintiff the results of 
his efforts as evidenced by a series of letters. (Depos. 
Exhibits 5 to 14; R. 69 to 80). The last letter was dated May 3
1 
1977. (Depos. 30; Depos. Exhibit 14; R. 80). 
Plaintiff's next contact with Dabney was in June 1978, 
more than a year later, after she received notice of a sheriff's 
sale. This was in connection with the foreclosure of another 
judgment lien in favor of Grill Advertisement. She took the 
foreclosure papers to Mr. Dabney, and he indicated that he would 
attempt to compromise the matter with the judgment creditor's 
attorney and have the foreclosure sale called off. In her pre-
sence, he called the other lawyer and asked him if he would stop 
the sale for cash payment of $400. Dabney advised her that the 
other lawyer had agreed to do so. She then delivered to Mr. 
Dabney $400 in cash to stop the foreclosure sale. A few days 
later Dabney called her and advised that the judgment creditor's 
lawyer had forgotten to stop the sale and that her house had been 
sold. (Depos. 31 to 33; R. 139-141). 
Dabney then advised her that the best thing that she 
could do at that point was to try to raise the $1,100 necessary 
to redeem the home by December of that year. (R. 127; Depos. 
34). $1,100 represented approximately the full amount of the 
judgment, accrued innterest, and costs. When plaintiff apprised 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
her husband of this, he advised her to go to defendant Barber and 
get the matter straightened out. (Depos. 34). Within one or two 
weeks thereafter, she went to see Barber, and took all of the 
pertinent documents to him. (Depos. 35; R. 20, 115). He told 
her there was nothing to worry about. She contacted Barber fre-
quently thereafter, and on a daily basis from December 1 to 
December 13, the last day of the redemption period. She had 
borrowed the $1,300 necessary to redeem the house. (Depos. p. 34 
to 36). However, she never received advice or instruction from 
Barber as to the procedure to be followed in accomplishing the 
redemption, with the result that the redemption period expired, 
and her ownership rights were permanently extinguished. 
After Dabney advised her in June of 1978 that she had to 
come up with $1,100 to save her home, she had no further dealings 
with him. (R. 127). "After that I talked to him no more." 
(Depos. 37). Thereafter plaintiff relied upon Barber's 
"assurance that he was looking into the matter and would see that 
it was taken care of." 
gatories No. 7; R. 20). 
(Plaintiff's answers to Barber's interro-
She never advised Dabney that she had raised the money 
to redeem the property, and never sought his advice or assistance 
in accomplishing this. 
In Summary: 
(1) Plaintiff's home was encumbered with liens in 
excess of her equity in the home at the time she first consulted 
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Dabney. All of the liens long antedated the engagement of 
Dabney's services, and he was in no wise responsible for their 
existence. 
(2) Judgment lien foreclosure proceedings were pending 
when plaintiff first consulted Dabney. He undertook to compro-
mise and settle the judgment claim for $400. Either through 
misunderstanding with the attorney representing the judgment er~ 
ditor, or because of breach of faith on his (attorney for 
judgment creditor) part, Dabney was unsuccessful in achieving 
compromise settlement and preventing the foreclosure sale. 
(3) Thereafter, both Dabney and Barber repeatedly 
advised the plaintiff that she could redeem the property by 
paying off the full amount of the judgment, accrued interest, and 
costs, in the approximate amount of $1,100. 
(4) After the foreclosure sale, plaintiff had no 
further dealings with Dabney, and relied upon the advice of 
Barber to save her home. For reasons not explained, she failed 
to pay the $1,100 amount, and her home was lost. 
On this state of the record, defendant Dabney moved for 
a summary judgment contending, first, that there was no evidence 
in the record of any negligence upon his part; and secondly, that 
even if his handling of the matter could be found to be negli-
gent, plaintiff sustained no damages as a result thereof or, at 
the most, no more than about $700, that is the difference between 
the proposed compromise settlement figure of $400 and the actual 
amount of the judgment lien. The trial court ruled in favor of 
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Dabney and entered judgment in his favor and against the plain-
tiff. (R. 155 to 156). Following trial and settlement of 
plaintiff's claim against Barber, this appeal was initiated (R. 
182) . 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has broken her argument up into three separate 
points or headings. As we view the matter, there is only one 
single issue before the Court--whether there is any evidence in 
the record that defendant Dabney was guilty of legal malpractice, 
and, if so, whether plaintiff sustained any damage as a result 
thereof. we, therefore, do not subdivide our argument into 
separate points. 
Our research has not discovered any case closely similar 
in point of fact to the case at bar. However, this case is 
somewhat analogous to the recent decision of this Court in the 
case of Hughes v. Housley v. Glen and Cotro-Manes, 599 P.2d 1250 
(1979). In that case, a claim was asserted against third-party 
defendant (successor attorney to the defendant and third-party 
plaintiff) for his failure to set aside a default judgment which 
occurred during the time that defendant and third-party plaintiff 
represented the plaintiff in the action. This Court observed 
that the position of the claimant, or third-party plaintiff, was 
no worse for third-party defendant's lack of success in failing 
to get the default judgment set aside. So here, at the time 
Plaintiff consulted with defendant, there was already a judgment 
- 7 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of record against plaintiff which was a lien on her property in 
the principal amount of approximately $750. Plaintiff did not 
have and could not raise the full amount necessary to satisfy the 
judgment before foreclosure sale. (R. 140; Depos. 32). The 
failure of the defendant to compromise and settle the action left 
plaintiff in no worse position than she was before she consulted 
defendant. Paraphrasing the language of Hughes v. Housley, it 
may be said: 
"For assuming arguendo that Cotro-Manes 
[DabneyJ was negligent in his handling of the 
case, his negligence cannot be said to have 
aggravated Hughes' [plaintiff's] injury or 
added to the damage." p. 1253. 
We agree with appellant's contention that legal malpra~ 
tice consists of the failure to use such skill, prudence and 
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly 
possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they 
undertake, and that when such failure proximately causes damages, 
it gives rise to an action in tort. {Appellant's Brief p. 5). 
However, plaintiff produced no evidence by way of affidavit, 
deposition or otherwise, that this defendant was guilty of any 
negligence or bad faith in his representation of the plaintiff. 
No evidence was produced that ordinary care required that defen-
dant reduce the proposed settlement agreement to writing, or that 
he check with the sheriff to determine that the foreclosure sale 
had been cancelled, or that he appear at the time and place of 
the foreclosure sale. Experience teaches that settlement 
agreements are commonly made among lawyers orally, and although 
- 8 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they are ordinarily ultimately reduced to writing, time 
constraints sometimes prevent their being formalized in writing 
prior to the occurrence of a specific event. After the foreclo-
sure sale, he advised her fully and completely as to her rights, 
and had she followed his advice her home would have been redeemed 
within the redemption period. 
Under any view of the evidence, the very most that could 
be said against defendant Dabney is that he was unsuccessful in 
his efforts to effect a compromise settlement of the judgment 
debt for $400, and therefore plaintiff became obligated to pay 
the total sum of approximately $1,100 in order to protect her 
home from loss by foreclosure sale. Assuming that the failure to 
consummate the settlement resulted from Dabney's negligence, the 
damage to the plaintiff would be the difference between the 
amount of the proposed settlement agreement of $400 and the 
amount which would have been necessary to redeem the property 
($1,100). 
It must also be remembered that at the time of the 
foreclosure sale there were many other liens against the 
plaintiff's home, exceeding in total the value of her equity in 
it. Had Dabney been successful in discharging the lien in 
question, undoubtedly others would have been asserted and other 
foreclosure proceedings brought. 
Also to be remembered is that if Dabney had been suc-
cessful in consummating a settlement of the judgment debt for 
$400, or any other sum less than the amount of the judgment, he 
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certainly would have been entitled to a reasonable attorney's 
fee. The record shows without dispute that he has been paid 
nothing for his services. The reasonable value of his services 
in effecting a settlement would be a proper offset against any 
amount which plaintiff would be entitled to recover. Mullen and 
Levit, Legal Malpractice, D§ 147-148, p. 213. 
Plaintiff did not have, and does not claim to have, any 
valid or meritorious defense to the judgment debt. She was in 00 
worse position by Dabney's having failed to compromise it than 
she was before she came to him. It is not malpractice to fail to 
secure a favorable result for a client when a client has no valid 
position; and if it can be said that Dabney was in any way negli-
gent, plaintiff's recovery should be limited to nominal damages 
only. See 7 Am.Jr. 2d Rev. Ed., p. 270, Attorneys at Law, § 226. 
Plaintiff's loss of her home resulted wholly from her 
own negligence in failing to follow the advice of Mr. Dabney and 
Mr. Barber to pay the amount of the judgment debt and costs in 
the amount of $1,100 prior to the expiration of the redemption 
period. That portion of the loss, resulting from her own negli-
gence must be borne by her. As said in Mullen & Levit, Legal 
Malpractice, § 151, p. 217: 
"There are occasions when the plaintiff 
through his own neglect may have increased or 
failed to reduce his damages. Consequently, 
the amount which is attributable to the 
plaintiff, and not the attorney, should be 
deducted from the total damages. These dama-
ges are those which are increased by the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence or which 
should have been mitigated by the plaintiff." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In summary, we respectfully submit: 
1. Plaintiff has demonstrated no negligence or bad 
faith upon the part of Dabney and therefore has shown no basis 
for recovery against him. 
2. Judgment was entered against plaintiff and was a 
lien upon her property long before she consulted with Dabney, and 
his failure to accomplish a compromise settlement of the judgment 
debt left her in no worse position than she was before she con-
sulted him. 
3. Even if it can be said that defendant Dabney was 
negligent in failing to consummate a settlement on behalf of the 
plaintiff for $400, or some other figure less than the amount of 
the judgment debt, his maximum liability to the plaintiff would 
be the difference between the amount of the proposed settlement 
agreement ($400), and the amount that was necessary to redeem the 
property by reason of the failure of the settlement agreement 
($1,100), or $700, less an offset for reasonable attorney's fees. 
Although it is unquestionably true that where there are 
disputed issues of fact a case cannot be determined by summary 
judgment, and must be submitted to a trier of fact on its merits: 
it is equally true that summary judgment serves the salutary pur-
pose of saving both courts and litigants the time, trouble, and 
expense of trial, where there are no genuine issues of fact. And 
unsworn statements in pleadings cannot stand in the face of sworn 
testimony by way of affidavit, answers to interrogatories, or 
deposition. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Ut. 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960), 
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and Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 24 Ut. 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 
(1970). We submit that this case is of the latter type. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above set forth, the judgment below 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
~ ~ I By , CJ d -i,; /] I <-
Ra~. ahristensen 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: 355-3431 
84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of July, 1981, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant 
and Respondent Virginius "Jinx" Dabney was mailed, postage pre-
paid to the following: 
Michael J. Wilkins 
Suite 1020 
Continental Bank Building 
200 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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